Discussion about the international policies of sneaker is important as the sneaker market has grown and other countries have influenced it more than China. The other political contexts of sneaker production in the world is also important.

One of the main themes is the relationship between consumers and the international policies that affect sneaker production. These policies can have a significant impact on the sneaker market, both in terms of production and consumption. The process of producing sneakers is complex and involves various stakeholders, including governments, producers, and consumers.

The relationship between the producer and the consumer is also important, as it affects the sneaker market and the relationship between the two parties. The sneaker market is influenced by various factors, including brand reputation, quality, price, and consumer preferences.

In conclusion, the discussion about the international policies of sneaker is important for understanding how the sneaker market works and how it affects the lives of consumers around the world.
would be South Korea that would be demanding our analytical attention. That is, the particular dynamics between American universities, American state officials, Asian factory women, Asian state officials, and executives of companies such as Reebok and Nike must be historicized. Globalizing sneakers is not a political process that began yesterday. The end of the 1960s stood at a very particular moment in the long-developing and ongoing gendered globalization of sneakers.

The offshore manufacture of sneakers really began in 1970s South Korea and to some extent Taiwan, and it was infused with the politics of the Cold War. Nike, Reebok, Adidas, Puma, and other sneaker companies began moving offshore. Nike's executives based in Oregon closed their last U.S. factory in Saco, Maine (one of America's poorest states), in 1973. They chose for their new factory sites two countries whose states were very closely allied to the U.S. state in the Cold War. This is not insignificant. Go home and line up your oldest and newest sneakers chronologically. I am suggesting that those sneakers that you could date back to the 1970s and 1980s, no matter what color they are, are khaki. That is, those pairs are militarized. Those sneakers were militarized by the kinds of agreements between three sets of political actors: American national security officials, South Korean generals then in control of South Korea's government, and corporate executives of the major American and European sneaker companies.

The politics of women in the globalization of sneakers is not understood by looking at simply the impact of globalization on women. Rather, women at several points have shaped globalization. Insofar as the sneaker industry — like the garment industry, like the tea industry, like the textile industry — depends for its bottom-line profits on the ability to make labor cheap and keep it cheap, those corporations' global strategizing is dependent upon local constructions of femininity. That is, in the 1970s and 1980s Nike's people in Beaverton, Oregon, were not just having an impact on women in South Korea. Those Korean women who became the assembly workers were crafting their own conceptions of femininity, and Nike became dependent on those women's constructions. What Nike executives, U.S. government Cold War strategists, Korean male factory managers, and the militarized officials of the 1970s to 1980s Seoul regime each — and together — thus sought to do was to exert pressure on those women so that their constructions of femininity would make their labor cheap.

Cheap labor. It's an analytically dreadful phrase. It hides politics. To casually (lazily) say that "cheap labor" was what lured Nike to South Korea is to tempt us to imagine that the labor of a Korean woman stitching a sneaker in 1975 was automatically ("naturally") cheap — as if it took no political effort to cheapen her labor. A more politically accurate phrase is "cheapened labor."

How? By whom? To answer these questions, one has to investigate the gendering of politics in a highly militarized South Korean society in the 1970s. Such a feminist exploration reveals that during the 1970s a lot of young women on small farms were being encouraged by the central government in Seoul to migrate from their small towns to cities in order to participate in the industrialization of their nation. South Korea's then highly militarized state encouraged young women migrants to see themselves as patriots, contributing to the nation by leaving their parents' homes to work in factories far from their parents' supervision.
It is with this insight in mind that we need to analyze South Korean factory women’s likelihood of unionizing. We need to look afresh at what was at stake when, in the early 1980s, activist university women such as Insook Kwon were urging factory women to join them in their public demands for democracy. It would have been perfectly logical for a young woman sewing sneakers for Nike or Reebok in South Korea in the 1980s to have hesitated. She would have strategically calculated that she needed to continue to send money home to her parents in order to maintain her reputation as a “good daughter” and to continue to put some money weekly into a savings account in order to accumulate enough to offer a suitable young man a dowry. For most of the women working in the factories around Seoul and Pusan, suitable husbands were men a little farther up the redesigned class hierarchy than they were—for instance, young men who worked for Hyundai shipbuilding or in low-level government civil service jobs. To work in the sneaker factory was many young women’s strategy to rise a rung on the Korean class ladder. But it entailed their constantly thinking about what young urban men desired in a marriage. Those men wanted fiancées who would bring decent dowries into a marriage.4

Sneaker company executives depended on these Korean women’s marriage strategies. The South Korean government depended on this. These elite men knew that women who were focused on their daughterly responsibilities and on marriage dowries were women who were not likely to strike for decent pay, for the right to unionize, or for democratic reforms. Thus when we think about globalization—and resistance to its more exploitative dynamics—we need to take women factory workers’ own priorities and strategies seriously. We need to employ a new analytical curiosity, a curiosity that seeks to unravel the Gordian knot tying together sneaker design, sneaker company labor calculations, local regime’s ideologies of femininity, working-class men’s marital expectations, middle-class pro-democracy alliance-building efforts, and factory women’s complex—and evolving—strategies.

South Korea is one of the success stories of democratization. To explain that success we must consider what it took in the mid-1980s for a Korean factory woman to reimagine herself so that she could, for instance, see it as reasonable to take the risk of attending a union rally. The democratization of labor unions came to be seen by many Koreans as integral to the democratization of the whole political system.

What do these insights imply for how we investigate the state, the foreign corporation, and its local capitalist subcontracting factory owner? Should we imagine that Nike executives in Oregon, generals and finance ministry economists in Seoul, and factory managers in Pusan each write formal memos about “the good daughter” and dowry practices? Perhaps not. We should, however, devise research approaches that make these masculinized elite calculations visible when they do exist.

Korean feminist activists and researchers, for example, have found that a number of factory owners set up dating services in the 1970s and 1980s. Why did they do that? Regularly replacing newly married women with unmarried novices ensured worker turnover. Turnover undercut seniority. Thus regular departures of current women employees due to marriage help a factory owner cheapen labor. Sometimes, of course, employers have a great stake in fostering seniority. It depends on what skills are deemed necessary to produce the product for the profit level de-
Naturally
success in pushing Indonesian generals out of power in 1998 also has pushed senior military men out of their corporate offices and boardrooms. Combining women-as-daughters sewing the sneakers with generals-as-board-members opening the right doors proved to be a winning strategy for certain sneaker companies in Indonesia in the 1980s and 1990s. Yet a lot of analyses about local Indonesian resistance to the Suharto regime were surprisingly ungendered. Who did the marching? Who walked out of factories to protest unlivable wages and denial of the right to independent union organizing? If one took a close look at photographs, one did see that oftentimes those demonstrations were composed of women. These were women who, according to researcher Diane Wolf, were recruited into factories here too as daughterly women workers so they could serve to cheapen labor enough to maximize profits in the making of athletic shoes. Here too, just as in 1970s South Korea, a masculinized, militarized state officialdom made the rhetoric of “patriotic” daughterly womanhood a building block of its industrializing strategy. Here too, statist nationalism, structural militarism, and selective local and foreign capitalist entrepreneurship were deemed an insufficient tripod on which to rest a globally competitive industrial project. What the Indonesian elite decided, just as had the South Korean elite before them, was that a fourth leg had to be constructed—and maintained. That fourth leg was an updated form of patriarchy. Making visible that state-maintained fourth leg and revealing the reliance of the other three legs of nationalist industrialism on that patriarchal fourth leg have been central efforts of both South Korean and Indonesian feminists.

Reebok or Nike can only permeate the international market if local societies do not change their ideas about what a “respectable young woman” is. Nike has a global advertising and marketing strategy that calls for the world to be one big homogenized market. But Nike executives do not want the world in practice to lose its heterogeneity of constructions of “respectable” femininity. Insofar as women in Indonesia or South Korea—or Vietnam or China—challenge on their own terms what it means to be a “respectable daughter,” what it means to be a “good wife,” they become women who are harder to manage and whose labor becomes harder to keep cheap. So, on the one hand, Nike is perhaps one of the best-known symbols of globalization; on the other, however, Nike and other sneaker companies depend on the impenetrability of alternative notions of women-as-citizen into those societies where these companies produce products. Sneaker company executives share this dependence with local authoritarian state elites who rely on patriarchal order. Consequently, while Nike, Reebok, and other sneaker giants may celebrate the globalized girl athlete in their advertisements, they simultaneously rely on regimes to undermine the legitimacy of local feminists’ challenging critiques with claims that those women activists are mere dupes of Western neo-imperialism.